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e3f7ff1123
14 focused tests on the extracted helper ``_xai_oauth_exchange_code_for_tokens`` cover: Core contract: * ``code_verifier`` is on the wire (RFC 7636 §4.5). * ``code_challenge`` + ``code_challenge_method=S256`` are echoed (the #26990 defense-in-depth that makes xAI's token endpoint stop rejecting valid exchanges). * ``grant_type=authorization_code``, ``code``, ``redirect_uri``, and ``client_id`` are all locked. * Content-Type is ``application/x-www-form-urlencoded`` (xAI rejects ``application/json`` on this endpoint). * The supplied ``token_endpoint`` URL is used verbatim — no hard-coded constant sneaks in via a future refactor. * ``timeout_seconds`` is forwarded; floored at 20s. Sanity guard: * Empty ``code_verifier`` raises ``xai_pkce_verifier_missing`` with a link to #26990 — and NOTHING is sent. Leaking the auth code to a server that can't redeem it is the wrong failure mode. * Empty ``code_challenge`` omits only the defensive echo; the standards-compliant ``code_verifier`` request still goes out so RFC-compliant servers keep working. Error surfacing: * Non-200 responses include both ``HTTP <status>`` and the body verbatim — disambiguates 400 (PKCE / bad request) from 403 (tier denied, see #26847). * Transport errors are wrapped as ``AuthError`` with the ``xai_token_exchange_failed`` code, so the surrounding ``format_auth_error`` UI mapping still fires. * Non-dict JSON payloads raise ``xai_token_exchange_invalid``. * 200 happy path returns the parsed payload dict verbatim. End-to-end wire-format guard: * A real ``httpx.Client`` with a stub transport captures the bytes on the wire and asserts every PKCE field round-trips through ``urlencode``. Catches a future refactor that swaps ``data=`` for ``json=`` (which xAI would silently reject).